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 Abstract. In spite of its infinite expectation value, the St. Petersburg game is not 
only a gamble without supply in the real world, but also one without demand at 
apparently very reasonable asking prices. We offer a rationalizing explanation of why the 
St. Petersburg bargain is unattractive on both sides (to both house and player) in the mid-
range of prices (finite but upwards of about $4).  Our analysis—featuring (1) the already-
established fact that the average of finite ensembles of the St. Petersburg game grows 
with ensemble size but is unbounded, and (2) our own simulation data showing that the 
debt-to-entry fee ratio rises exponentially—explains why both house and player are quite 
rational in abstaining from the St. Petersburg game.  The house will be unavoidably (and 
intentionally) exposed to very large ensembles (with very high averages, and so very 
costly to them), while contrariwise even the well-heeled player is not sufficiently 
capitalized (as our simulation data reveals) to be able to capture the potential gains from 
large-ensemble play. (Smaller ensembles, meanwhile, enjoy low means, as others have 
shown, and so are not worth paying more than $4 to play, even if a merchant were to 
offer them at such low prices per trial.)  Both sides are consequently rational in abstaining 
from entry into the St. Petersburg market in the mid-range of asking prices.  We utilize 
the concept of capitalization vis-à-vis a gamble to make this case.   Classical analyses of 
this question have paid insufficient attention to the question of the propriety of using 
expected values to assess the St. Petersburg gamble. And extant analyses have not noted 
the average-maximum-debt-before-breaking-even figures, and so are incomplete. 
 
1. Introduction 
The St. Petersburg paradox is among the most celebrated in mathematical economics and 
decision theory.  Still, we shall argue that the St. Petersburg has been incompletely 
analyzed.  With regard to the St. Petersburg game, the fundamental question is: what is a 
fair asking price for entry to play the St. Petersburg game?  The most prominent answer 
is of course the expected value or the expected return. We shall argue that the information 
about expected value is insufficient for evaluating the St. Petersburg gamble. And our 
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of inquiry—the principle that the expectation value plays exactly the same role in 
assessing every “gamble”, no matter what the statistics of the gamble might be.   
 
We argue that in the St. Petersburg game there is, additionally, another important 
consideration: the ratio of return to amount invested (or in different terms, debt 
accumulated), which shall require the concept of capitalization. We argue that this 
concept plays an important role in proper (instrumental) reasoning about options. We 
shall show that, because the statistics of the St. Petersburg is not normal (because the 
probability distribution function, or PDF, follows a power law), the quantity of debt that 
may be expected to accumulate before a positive return on investment occurs cannot be 
directly inferred from any computation of expected or average payout.  Furthermore, 
computing the debt-to-return ratio analytically does not seem to be possible for the St. 
Petersburg, so we shall employ simulations for an estimation of this quantity, in the spirit 
of Buffon who (in 1777) was the first to run live trials of the St. Petersburg game. 
 
Our analysis produces the result that there is no fair asking price for the St. Petersburg.  
But also that paying much less than the expectation value does not amount to mere 




2. From Russia with utility 
The St. Petersburg game originated in the writings of Nicolas Bernoulli, but its value as a 
diagnostic instrument—its capacity to pinpoint key features of importance in matters of 
decision—was first appreciated by his cousin Daniel Bernoulli, who published his 
solution to it (Bernoulli 1738) in the eponymous Commentaries of the Imperial Academy 
of Science of Saint Petersburg. The game is played by tossing a fair coin until it lands 
heads; the first occurrence of heads ends the game.  The payout (prize) on any given play 
of this game is determined by the number n of times the coin is tossed before the game 
ends, and equals $2
n
. Thus if play results in a head on the first toss, the payout is $2
1
 = 
$2. If play results in a tail on the first toss, the coin is tossed again. If a head results the 
second time, the prize is $2
2
 = $4. And so on. There are an infinite number of possible 
scenarios (runs of tails followed by a single head). The probability of a scenario of n 
tosses P(n) is 1/2
n
, and the payout for each scenario is the prize times its probability. 
Table 1 lists these figures where n = 1 … 10. 
 
 
n  P(n)  Prize  Scenario payout 
1     $2 $1 
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3     $8 $1 
4      $16 $1 
5      $32 $1 
6      $64 $1 
7       $128 $1 
8       $256 $1 
9       $512 $1 
10        $1024 $1 
Table 1: St. Petersburg schedule of payouts. 
 
 
Will you play the game?   Here now is one formula to help you decide, that we shall 
apply presently to the St. Petersburg problem. 
 
Suppose you are deciding between doing A or not doing A. Suppose that if you pick A, 
you will then be subject to some number (n) of possible outcomes (       ), which you 
assess at different utilities             ).  Assume that you know the probabilities 
associated with each outcome: P (          ∑   
 
     .  If the probabilities are not 
trivial (not all either zeros or 1s), the decision you face will be a decision under risk. 
Let’s designate by the term expectation of A—      for short—the quantity computed as 
follows: 
 
      ∑        
 
    . 
 
The fundamental theorem of Expected Utility (EU) says that you should assess the utility 
of doing A by its expectation       , and accordingly you should  proceed to pick 
between doing A and not doing A directly on the basis of these expectations: you should 
perform the action with the higher expected utility.  Let’s refer to the directive to decide 
on the basis of expectations as the expectation principle. 
 
This now-familiar principle is based on an idea that has received too little critical 
scrutiny: the idea that the expectation value can play the same role in assessing any 
“gamble”, no matter what the statistics of the gamble might be.  That is an idea that we 
will challenge here;
1
 we will do it by considering  alternative conceptions of assessing 
gambles with non-Gaussian statistics, like the St. Petersburg gamble. 
 
Now let’s calculate the expectation of playing the St. Petersburg game.  This will be a 
weighted sum of all the possible scenarios. For the sake of argument, let’s suppose that 
                                                 
11
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the utility of $1 is proportional to its monetary value (since nothing but money is staked, 
this seems at least initially plausible). Since the payout of each possible scenario is $1, 
and there are an infinite number of scenarios, this sum diverges.   You should play the 
game, according to the expectation principle, if and only if the price of playing is less 
than this sum—in other words, you should play the game so long as the house is asking a 
finite sum, no matter how large! Accordingly, EU requires the rational player to pay any 
price to play, as long as it is finite.  But it also seems obvious that some asking prices are 
too high for a rational agent to pay for a chance to play. Bernoulli himself thought this 
was so. 
 
Bernoulli drew the conclusion that one should not assess the value of the gamble in line 
with its monetary expectation.  In making this philosophical move he invented the very 
notion of utility (and simultaneously with it the diminishing marginal utility of money):
2
 
forever after Bernoulli’s innovation, a rational individual will be obliged to produce a 
complete matrix of valuations (that today we refer to as preferences); these valuations 
provide the foundation for a utility function that lies at the base of the EU decision 
formula.  Since Bernoulli’s invention, adjustments of the paradox have been devised to 
impugn Bernoulli’s utility innovation as the defining solution of the game (cf. Martin 
2011).  Consider, for instance, Menger’s (1967) adjustment.  Menger replaces payouts in 
monetary units with payouts in utiles.
3
  Menger’s version of the puzzle is thus immune to 
Bernoulli’s solution, which is excellent evidence of the fact that Bernoulli’s analysis—in 
spite of its intellectual brilliance and insight—has failed to plumb the depths of the St. 
Petersburg game. 
 
One proposal to stem the bleeding
4
 comes in the form of a suggestion that it is 
inappropriate to suppose that utility can increase without limit.  While it might well be 
true that a reasonable person cannot be indifferent between $1000 and $1,000,000, it 
might nonetheless be true that sums exceeding, say, $1 billion should, for all intents and 
purposes, be treated identically—that they have hit a ceiling of value.  (If we set the 
ceiling at $16 million, the maximum rational entry fee is about $25.  For a utility cap to 
explain a top bid of about $4, roughly what empirical studies indicate ordinary people 
bid—see Hayden and Platt (2009)—the cap would have to considerably less—perhaps 
about $1000, which is very implausible.)  Is it reasonable to set an upper bound on 
utility—a proposal that Hardin (1982) calls “compelling in its own right”, and many find 
compelling (for instance Jeffrey 1983)?  Martin (2011) is rightly skeptical: 
We can readily imagine someone with … any amount of money…still short of 
utility, due to lack of certain goods that money can’t buy. What the idea of an 
                                                 
2
 Dutka (1988) notes that elements of this idea were already considered by Buffon before Bernoulli wrote 
them down. 
3
 It is not our intention to evaluate Menger’s solution here, but only to note his reformulation of the St. 
Petersburg gamble so as to show the inadequacy of simple utility as its solution. 
4
 We will simply ignore proposals to dismiss the problem as unrealistic for any of a number of reasons, 
including impracticability or the impossibility of the house making good on a win.  Such proposals simply 
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upper limit on utility means is that there is some amount of utility which is so 
high that no additional utility is possible—that nothing additional adds any value 
at all. Imagine someone with all the wealth he could use: still he might have 
unfulfilled desires, for example, that his friends and relations be as fortunate as 
he. If this desire were fulfilled, then he might still desire that strangers be as 
fortunate; and that there be more people on earth than there currently were, to 
share his happiness, and more populated planets full of happy people. How many 
more? Why, the more the better—indefinitely more. If there is an upper limit on 
utility, then there is some finite amount of utility which is maximally good, an 
amount for which one would rationally trade anything else. It doesn't appear 
plausible to think that there is any such amount. 
 
To this day, no known solution to the St Petersburg paradox has received a consensus 
status. (It is perhaps noteworthy that Buffon writing in the 18
th
 century, offered numerous 
approaches to solving the problem, many of them precursors of those I sketched above, 
and himself never seemed completely satisfied with any one of them; see Dutka 1989 for 
details of Buffon’s numerous stratagems.) At this point it might be wise to reexamine the 
expectation principle itself—to consider alternatives to it.  Perhaps the St. Petersburg 
itself provides reasons to counter the expectation principle. 
 
One may counter the expectation principle in a number of ways; we will enumerate 
several sorts of counters that make an appearance in the scholarship on decision.  First is 
the counter by counterexample, meant to discredit the theory of expected utility but not to 
pinpoint the source of its failure.  Typical examples of this counter direct attention to 
various bodies of evidence (for example the large body of data on preference reversal) 
suggesting that human beings simply don’t comply with the dictates of EU, and insist that 
these decisions can nonetheless (in the same circumstances) be construed as rational; so 
the EU proposal must not be normative (Rabin 2000 and Rabin and Thaler 2001 present a 
recent version of this counter; but most of the original paradoxes of utility theory, with 
one of the most famous being associated with the name of Maurice Allais, take this form 
as well).  Second, one may insist that       is an inappropriate measure of the utility due 
to an action A.  This counter too can take many forms.   For instance, one may simply 
insist that actions do not in general possess utilities, or that the utility of an act has to be a 
function of more than the utilities of outcomes.  Such counters generally reject the 
framework of decision theory. Or, alternatively, such counters may embrace the 
instrumental framework but reject the proposal that the utility of an action be 
expectational—for example because only probabilities and utilities appear in it.  Research 
under this last proposal takes it for granted that EU as a general formula requires 
emendation, for example vis-à-vis attitudes toward risk, and that modifying the theory 
with some other parameters for risk aversion (for instance) improves it. (Proposals 
advancing non-expected theories of utility are versions of this species of anti-


















anuscript          




In this paper we advance a variant on the last proposal—we shall defend a certain amount 
of anti-expectationalism. On our account, an expectation value is not always a good 
measure of the value of an action in the context of a distribution function that follows a 
power law.  (And it will be clear when we reach the conclusion that the expectation value 
is not adequate even in some cases where the distributions are indeed normal.
5
) We will 
show that a more measured assessment of the value of the St. Petersburg game can reveal 
why it’s the case that, name any price above about $4, and neither party, neither house 
nor player, is prepared to take the bet in real life (and  most especially not if offered it as 
a one-off play).
6
 These recent studies stand in a tradition of scrutinizing the psychology 
of gambling; but Buffon’s original simulations were meant to provide a normative 
analysis—an analysis of the rationality of refraining from playing the game.  Our 
analysis, like Buffon’s, is also meant to show why refraining is rational. 
 
 
3. Heavy tails 
Statisticians have for many decades now characterized distributions via a number of 
parameters (called moments) that are meant to give a measure of the shape of distribution 
curves like that in Figure 1 on the right.  This is a binomial distribution curve well 
estimated by the most familiar of bell-shaped curves—the Gaussian, the poster child for 
statistics itself; it can for instance be generated by repeated tossing of a single fair coin, 
whose characteristics are depicted in Figure 1 on the left.  One moment of a distribution 
(the second, as it happens) provides a measure of the width of the set of points; another 
provides a measure of the skew (distribution around the mean).  The first moment is, of 
course, the mean itself—the average.  Every finite distribution will have a (finite) mean.  
And so will some infinite distributions. But not all infinite distributions have finite 




                                                 
5
 Peters (2011a) offers a proposal to dissolve the St. Petersburg that, in line with our criticism of the 
expectation principle, restricts use of the expectations to only those instances where time averages and 
ensemble average can be proven to converge.  Peters’s solution therefore agrees with Bernoulli’s by 
computing a concave valuation of the gamble.  Our account shows that, furthermore, there is no fair asking 
price for the gamble. 
6
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Figure 1: The histogram on the left depicts the possible outcomes with their relative frequencies; no others are 
possible; the right depicts the relative frequencies of n "successes" out of N (=100) trials of the game, as a 
function of n—this is the probabiblity distribution function or PDF 
 
 
Gaussians are employed throughout the sciences, especially the social sciences, for 
analyzing data.  Observational error in experiment is routinely assumed to be normally 
distributed, and propagation of error is routinely computed using this assumption.  The 
fundamental condition that makes a Gaussian an appropriate tool of analysis is the 
condition that in certain “trials” of the distribution (whether it’s an experiment or a set of 
measurements of an unknown parameter or quantity) random variations will render the 
outcome a bit larger than the average (or “correct”) value, whereas in other trials random 
variations (of the same or other things) will render the outcome a bit smaller.  So that in 
the final analysis, combining all these values and employing an averaging algorithm (for 
example employing a least squares analysis to a distribution of data) makes the errors 
cancel and the final verdict closer to the “correct” one than the result of any one 
measurement on its own.  But this computation is correct only if it is really true that the 
errors that lead to overestimation are appropriately balanced by errors that lead to 
underestimation.  This condition holds when the tails (the ends of the distribution on the 
upper end—the right side) are thin—thin enough to be counterbalanced by the area under 
the tail on the left side of the distribution; this occurs when the “random” process 
generating larger values produces them at a rate that decays extremely fast.  Otherwise 
the small values or “underestimations” cannot ever keep up with the large values or 
“overestimations”, no matter how many of them we add in. So only when the rate of 
values decays very fast can the situation be consistent with the assumption of “random 
distribution around the mean.” This condition does not hold when the process generating 
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relationship, as in the St. Petersburg), and generated quite independent of any mean.  
When this is the case, it is sometimes said that we are dealing with “fat” or “heavy” tails.  
Topics surrounding tail heaviness are receiving renewed attention in the area of finance 
recently, though they are hugely important in the social and natural sciences quite 
generally.  Fat tails were introduced into mathematical finance in 1963 by Benoit 
Mandelbrot himself, who discussed there the example of cotton price changes 
(Mandelbrot 1963). Since that time, Mandelbrot and others have been assembling a body 
of evidence that  many types of phenomena in nature, from risks of financial losses to 
natural disasters, are best characterized by heavy-tail distributions (e.g., Mandelbrot  
1982, 2004; Malamud and Turcotte 2006; Latchman,  Morgan and Aspinall 2008). The 
uncertainty surrounding climate change impacts may also generate heavy tails (see 
Weitzman 2009).  
 
We cannot discuss heavy-tailed phenomena in any detail.   Still we need to make the 
simple point that the event distribution wrought by any St Petersburg mechanism is a 
heavy-tailed one, because it is generated by a power law with exponent 2.
7
  And, quite 
apart from the importance of this fact for statistical analysis, there are further 
philosophical lessons to be drawn about the value of gambles on the St. Petersburg.  But 
first things first. 
 
To start, notice that the St. Petersburg mechanism produces a non-Gaussian probability 
distribution.  It generates an ever larger number of ever smaller-probability outcomes.  
And at every stage of the mechanism, the remaining (unrealized) portion of the total 
distribution—assuming the game is not concluded—is an exact copy, though at a smaller 
scale, of the ones that comprised the unrealized portion of the total at any previous stage 
of the generating process.  This is sometimes called a fractal distribution.  The 
distribution is non-Gaussian because it is generated by a power law and not a random 
process.  And it enjoys no finite mean—as we’ve already noted, its expectation diverges.    
What does this portend? 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Technically, the definition of a heavy-tail distribution is in terms of the probability of 
finding larger values than the present one: if the probability of a larger value than  , is 
inversely proportional to some power α of  , then the distribution is heavy-tailed, and its 
tail exponent is α.  In the St. Petersburg case, since the probability of an outcome larger 
than   (paying out   ) is on the order of   ⁄  (that is,    ⁄ ), its tail exponent is 1. This 
is much too small a tail exponent than is required to ensure convergence of a mean over 
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4. False expectations? 
One answer is that the mean in such cases is meaningless (no pun intended), and the 
expectation too.  Neither is entitled to consideration in our deliberations.  In a recent 
article, Hayden and Platt (2009) argue that the  
true root of the St. Petersburg Paradox lies in the deﬁnition of expected value 
(Gigerenzer& Selten, 2002; Liebovitch & Scheurle, 2000; Lopes, 1981). Expected 
value is the central tendency of the distribution embodied in a given gamble. For a 
Gaussian distribution, the central tendency is given by its mean. For highly non-
Gaussian distributions, such as the St. Petersburg gamble, the mean provides a 
poor estimate (Hinners & Tobraegel, 2003; Liebovitch & Scheurle, 2000). 
Consequently, the true expected value of the St. Petersburg gamble is not inﬁnite, 
but is undeﬁned, so no bid is inconsistent with theory, and there is no paradox.  
 
They take this to mean that any bid on the St. Petersburg game is a rational bid—
anything goes when the mean diverges.  But this is too hasty—and furthermore fails to 
explain why we don’t have many offers on the St. Petersburg of much higher than $5, as 
Hayden and Platt’s own empirical data show.  Their move presupposes that only 
normally distributed phenomena have important tendencies—but this is not true.  Indeed, 
the fact that fat tails are generated by power laws is evidence to the contrary.  We simply 
have to be more open-minded about “tendencies.”  Hayden and Platt refer to Liebovitch 
and Scheurle (2000) in support of their contentions.  But these latter researchers write: 
The statistical methods that assume that the PDF [probability distribution 
function] of the data has a normal distribution provide meaningful measures, 
namely the mean and variance, to characterize that type of data. However, when 
those methods are applied to data that have a fractal rather than a normal 
distribution, the results are not meaningful. For a fractal distribution both the 
mean and variance will depend on the amount of data analyzed. We need to use 
appropriate fractal measures, such as the fractal dimension, to characterize fractal 
data in a meaningful way (Liebovitch and Scheurle 2000, 36). 
 
According to Liebovitch and Scheurle, we need to use “appropriate fractal measures” to 
characterize the relevant features of a fractal distribution (such as that associated with the 
St. Petersburg game), and to use these measures meaningfully in valuations of risks and 
gambles.  A non-Gaussian distribution does not license any valuation whatever.  This is 
sage advice.  So we will discuss some more reasonable ways of measuring expectations 
for the St. Petersburg gamble. 
 
5. St. Petersburg Statistics 
While the St. Petersburg game ranks among the best known and most venerable 
conundrums in mathematical economics and decision theory, and while the game itself is 
quite easy to describe and grasp without the assistance of high-powered mathematical 
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the simplicity of its probability distribution function.  Statistical properties of a host of 
quantities associated with it are analytically unknown, perhaps the most important being 
the average payout of (random) finite sequences of game play.  To provide a detailed 
analysis of this feature of the game (hugely important for working out a fair asking price), 
we require a detailed analysis of its distribution function (the distribution of all possible 
payout sums, vis-à-vis a given sequence length of game play).  As Rodriguez (2006, 926) 
writes, “this theoretical analysis remains conspicuously absent from the literature after 
nearly three centuries of scrutiny, unmistakably signaling the complexity of the task.”8  
He proceeds to display some of these complexities in his article, but also to show that we 
can get some picture of the behavior of these important features of the distribution via 
computer simulations.
9
  Using computer simulations as evidence, Rodriguez extracts 
important features of the St Petersburg average payout distributions for finite sequences 
of game play.   
 
While the St. Petersburg game enjoys no finite mean (assuming of course that one can 
play it repeatedly), ensembles of “trials” of the St. Petersburg games nonetheless seem to 
enjoy some important tendencies.  We turn now to discussion of ensembles.  We will not 
be concerned with the time to perform each “trial” of the St. Petersburg game, but simply 
assume in our study that each trial is performed instantaneously.  (Obviously it takes 
some time to perform a trial in a simulation, but we will simply ignore the differences 
between length of trials for our purposes.)  Like Rodriguez, everything we shall say will 
be about ensembles of trials—indeed much of what we say will be about ensembles of 
ensembles of such trials. 
 
Perhaps the most important Rodriguez’s findings is that modes (most common values of 
ensembles of trials) of the St. Petersburg exist, and that these modes seem to increase 
with the number of trials in the ensemble. One way to express this finding is to say that 
ensembles of larger sizes are characterized or typified by larger average payouts. 
Compare for instance the distributions of average payouts for ensembles of 1000 trials 
and 100,000 trials, respectively, in Figure 2 (from Rodriguez 2006): 
  
                                                 
8
 The physics literature contains a few discussions of typical averages of finite ensembles—for example 
Redner (1990).  A more recent study in Brownian motion is Peters and Klein (2012).  Still, studies of 
typicality in finite distributions are few. 
9
 Rodriguez also contends that a fair asking price is equal to the mode of the distribution, because its shape 
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Figure 2: Average payouts (in dollars) along the horizontal axis in each diagram.  The top histogram 
corresponds to means of ensembles of 1000 trials, while the bottom histogram represents average payouts of 
ensembles of 100,000 trials.  Notice that the modes are displaced only by about $7.  Notice also the very heavy 
tails. 
 
This feature of the St. Petersburg game also emerges in depictions of the evolution in the 
average payouts over a single path.  Libovitch and Shuerle (2000, 38) present the results 
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Figure 3: Results from Liebovitch and Schuerle's (2000) run of 10 million simulations.  Number of trials is 
depicted on the horizontal axis. 
 
























anuscript          




Compare these with typical runs of a simple game with a fair coin where the payoff is 
computed at the end of each toss (the game depicted in Figure 1)  A long sequence of 






Figure 5: Average winnings per game, as a function of number of games played for the game depicted in Figure 
1. The data is from Libovitch and Shuerle (2000). 
 
 
6. More reasonable expectations 
We state in the strongest possible terms that the principles we shall be applying may be 
inapt for other gamble contexts.  Readers may generalize at their own risk.  Some of the 
philosophical morals we draw are general, and the principle of capitalization will have 
wide application, but we do not warrant that these wider morals will result in similar 
appraisals of other gambles or gamble context.   
 
In light of the statistics we have reviewed, a certain proposal emerges: it seems fair for 
the house to sell tokens for the St. Petersburg game only in batches (contracted to a given 
player), and for each token in a batch to be priced at the mean or the mode of a similar-
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payout of an ensemble of game play rises as you play more, then you should be willing to 
pay more in proportion to the number of times you are considering playing.  Surely this 
sliding scale represents reasonable asking prices on the consumer end than the original 
(infinite) calculation of expectations. 
 
We grant that this is perhaps the most reasonable pricing scheme on the consumer end.  
But we will argue that, even so, neither the house nor the player will find the bargain very 
attractive. 
 
On the house’s end, it’s easy to see why this is a poor bargain.  Because from the 
perspective of the house, the St. Petersburg represents an effectively infinite ensemble of 
trials. To offer the St. Petersburg as a merchant is effectively to expose oneself to an 
unbounded number of trials each of which represents a risk of a high payout, since it 
makes no difference whether the house plays one game against each player or all games 
against a single player.  Since ensemble average increases with number of exposures, the 
house is exposing itself to enormous losses by taking on all comers, even if each of them 
plays only one game. So for the house there is no acceptable finite asking price.  
 
Now, on the consumer end things are a bit different.  The consumer prefers longer 
ensembles to shorter ones, since the average payouts of the former are larger.  But since 
the asking prices are proposed to be higher for larger numbers of tickets, the consumer 
has to be very well capitalized to enter into any such bargain. By capitalization vis-à-vis 
a gamble, we mean the amount of money (or what-have-you) the gambler is prepared to 
stake in the proposition, whether it is in a single play of the game, or in multiple plays of 
it. 
 
By contrast with the larger ensembles, bundles of one or two trials only are very 
unattractive to the consumer, since the average payout per play for these bundles is very 
close to $2 for a nearly-sure loss at asking prices higher than $2. 
 
We can imagine a hypothetical critic who interjects at this stage that the original 
calculation of the St. Petersburg’s value—its expectation (as infinite)—is nonetheless 
vindicated by our analysis, since expectation is the mean payout in ensembles of trials, as 
the size of ensembles tends to infinity.  And so this (infinite) expectation is nonetheless 
an expression of the gamble’s full potential, according to the hypothetical critic.  After 
all, the probability distribution function of the St. Petersburg is not that of Figure 1, but 
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Figure 6: This depicts the possible outcomes of the St. Petersburg (in n dollars won) with their relative 






There is something to the critic’s point.  The averages of infinite ensembles of trials of 
the St. Petersburg are indeed unbounded.  And, indeed as we ourselves have argued, it 
seems as though this fact explains surpassing well why the house finds the bargain 
unattractive to offer at less than infinite entrance fees.  But obviously this point cannot 
possibly explain why real-life players find the St. Petersburg bargain unattractive in small 
bundles.  Are they being irrational?  Or are they instead making estimation mistakes 
(using the median rather than the mean, for example—Hayden and Platt believe that’s 
what people are actually doing)? 
 
We agree with the hypothetical critic that the probability distribution function (such as 
for instance depicted in Figure 6) represents the gamble’s full potential to a hypothetical 
someone.  But it doesn’t follow from this that the value of a gamble, to the player who 
must pay to play, must always be in simple proportion to the outcomes in these figures 
weighted by their probabilities.  This may be a reasonable way to appraise the St. 
Petersburg game from the standpoint of the house, since the house expects to realize 
some proportion of a rather wide spectrum (though it has still to be admitted, not all) of 
this game’s scenarios—they’re in the business of offering gambles open-endedly.  But 
the same reasoning is not open to a real-life player who has something to lose in addition 
to something to gain. In other words, it doesn’t follow from the undisputed fact that the 
PDF represents a gamble’s full potential, that the player’s valuation of the gamble, to him 
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The assumption that valuations must be expectational, as now might have become clear, 
rests on an assumption about the relationship of the player to the potential outcomes in 
view—namely that the player is in a position to view each outcome scenario (the first ten 
of which we listed in Table 1) as making a nonnegligible contribution to his or her utility 
“purse.”  It’s clear that, in the face of a normal distribution, contributions to that purse 
that occur with small enough probabilities can be ignored—not simply because their 
probabilities are too small, but because their smallness is not also counterbalanced by the 
size of the outcome.  Small probabilities, by themselves, don’t give a player a reason to 
discount the scenario (a proposal also first floated by Buffon in the last 18
th
 century, but 
which has received support from numerous others since). This principle, however, rests 
on the idea that every possible outcome makes an appropriately weighted contribution to 
the value of the gamble as a whole.  But this principle is valid only if one is expecting to 
play “long enough” to realize the probabilities in question in their true proportions. 
Samuelson (1963) saw clearly the relationship between expectational valuation and 
repeated play: “Each outcome must have its utility reckoned at the appropriate 
probability; and when this is done it will be found that no sequence is acceptable if each 
of its single plays is not acceptable.”  But why should a real-life someone who will be 
realizing only a small handful out of the infinite possible scenarios, because s/he is in a 
position to play only once (or, more generally, a relatively small number of times), have 
to “reckon all the utilities at their appropriate probabilities”? 
 
To motivate our challenge somewhat more concretely, we ask you to consider two 
gambles—Right and Left, as depicted in Figure 7.  There is nothing distinctive about 
these bets—no divergent means, no uncountable potential outcomes.  Everything is 
straightforward, and their expectations are identical—namely, 1 monetary unit (mu).  The 
difference between them is that Left gives players very small chances at each of 1 mu and 
9 mu, and comparatively larger chances at nothing, while Right gives players roughly 
even chances at the comparatively much smaller sums of 0.6 mu and 1.6 mu 
(respectively). Let’s suppose it costs 1 mu to play once.   Assuming a wealth level that 
allows for a constant aversion to risk in the relevant range (namely in the range of   
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Figure 7: Two bets (Left and Right) with identical expectations. 
Suppose you have 1000 mu to play—that you have budgeted that sum for gambling—
then you might quite rightly be indifferent to the two gambles, figuring that if it costs 
1mu to play, then you can expect to double your money by playing all 1000 mu on either 
game: you’d win              mu by going left and                   
mu by going right—that’s what the expectation principle tells you.  But if instead the 
game were more costly as well as more profitable by a hundred-fold, as depicted in 
Figure 8, and you still have only 1000 mu budgeted to the game, then you might well 
figure: if it costs 100mu to play, then by playing only ten time, you are quite likely to end 
up with absolutely nothing (a loss of your initial 1000 mu stakes) if you play Left, 
whereas playing Right will at worst yield 600 mu (for an overall loss of 400mu), so that 
Right is much to be preferred, in spite of the equal expectations.  Statistics can matter 
over and above what they contribute to an expectation, even when the outcome 
distribution is very simple and everything converges.  And this example also 
demonstrates that statistics can matter over and above risk aversion.  Someone who is 
willing to take either Left or Right in the game in Figure 7, because they know they can 
play 1000 or more times, might well turn down both games in Figure 8, because they can 
play either one only ten times.  And there’s nothing irrational about it.  The statistics 
matter, and this is over and above anything to do with wealth-based risk aversion.  It’s a 
matter of capitalization vis-à-vis the gamble in question. In the latter case, were you to 
decline either gamble in Figure 8, you may simply be realizing that you’re insufficiently 
capitalized for doubling your money in the enterprise on offer, and perhaps there are 
better gambles elsewhere—for instance the games in Figure 7—for which you are better 
capitalized. We invoke this principle to explain why players (who are not especially 
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Figure 8: Another set of gambles, like those in Figure 7 but with the entrance fees scaled by 100. 
 
7. Capitalization in St. Petersburg 
Our St. Petersburg simulation data reported in Figure 9 tell the story.  True: ensemble 
mean rises with number of trials in an ensemble, but this rise is quite slow—this is 
Rodriguez’s findings.  By contrast, the debt-to-entrance-fee ratio rises exponentially.  We 
ran a simulation of St. Petersburg with entrance fee as the free parameter.  At each fee 
depicted in the figure we ran 10,000 simulation trials, and stopped each one at the first 
point where the player was ahead of the house by $1 or more. In other words, for each of 
10,000 simulations at a given entry fee, we compelled the simulated player to play the 
game as many times as it takes to break even. Then we averaged the (10,000) data points 
to arrive at a measure of average accumulated-debt-before-breaking-even at that entry 
fee. The simulation data provides a measure of the capital required to break even, at a 
given entrance fee.  The result, depicted in Figure 9, is the (exponential) rise of debt as a 
function of entry fee.  What this data says is that a player can foresee that the rise in 
average returns, for playing the game more frequently, is not offset by the expected debt 
in doing so.  The rational limiting factor for any given player has got to be their 
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Figure 2: Capitalization of St. Petersburg. Our St. Petersburg simulations of average debt before breaking even, 
as a function of entrance fee; notice the log scale. (The code generating these simulations is in the Appendix.)  Cf. 
our results with the exact results of Peters (2011b) on optimal leverage. 
For example, at $6 per game, a player will on average go into debt $1000 before simply 
breaking even.  At only $11 per game, a player will have to go into debt (on average) 
more than $100,000 before breaking even!   
 
These data now provide extremely good cautionary reasons for not playing the game at 
all, and this is especially so if one has a small discretionary budget.  Combining our 
findings with those of Rodriguez, we reason as follows:  Suppose we have a person with 
a disposable budget of say $2000.  Assuming a finite entry fee to play St. Petersburg, that 
person can play a finite number of trials.  The average payout per trial will depend on the 
number of trials played.  So suppose that the fee is set at a very modest $2.  This person 
will be able to play 1000 games.  The average payout at this figure is in the neighborhood 
of $10.  So it would seem quite lucrative to play a large number of trials at this entrance 
fee.  And at this entrance fee, there are no serious debt barriers to someone with the 
devoted capital we have supposed: the average maximum debt before breaking even, at 
this entry fee, is under $10.  But things change very rapidly with change of entry fee.  
Suppose the house asks only $8 for the privilege to play.  Our hypothetical gambler will 
now be able to play only 250 times.   Based on Rodriquez’s findings, this player’s 
average return will be something below $10 per trial of 250 (since this player will be 
playing fewer times than the first player).  A risk-tolerant player might be enticed even at 
this entry fee by the very large possible payouts depicted in latter scenarios of Table 1.  
Now here’s where our findings come in.  At an entry fee of $8, a player can anticipate 
having to go into debt about $5000 before breaking even—before he can recover an 
(optimistic) average return of about $10 per trial.  And that’s precisely where 
capitalization matters!  Since our hypothetical player only has $2000 to put towards this 
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Where precisely is the turning point? We cannot, given our analysis, make a prediction 
about any given population’s willingness to pay, without knowing something about the 
distribution of capitalization in the population.  Still, we know that someone willing to 
play 1000 times can anticipate an average payout of about $10 per game.   Consider an 
entry fee of $4.  Someone with $4000 to stake stands to make $40,000 at the game, 
provided they are allowed to play as often as 1000 times.  But how much debt can this 
person expect to accumulate before breaking even?  Our findings put this figure at less 
than $100.  But now someone else, with less than $100 to stake, could not afford to play 
the game in a way that promises any return at all.  It’s why different levels of 
capitalization matter to being able to predict willingness to pay. 
 
So, while the Rodriguez findings (building on Buffon’s initial insights, as well as 
utilizing the simulation methods too) explain why the house cannot expose itself by 
offering the St. Petersburg, our own findings extend these results, by explaining why a 
player with less than $100 to stake on the game will not wish to play the game at $4. 
 
 
8. Capitalization is a dirty word? 
 
We have explained the unattractiveness of the St. Petersburg gamble by calling on 
different facts to explain its unattractiveness to each side.  In other words, we contend 
that there is no single explanation for why it is unattractive, but multiple explanations 
depending on which side of the bargain is being considered.  And moreover that whether 
the bargain is attractive depends on how well-capitalized the player happens to be for the 
game, in addition to average expectation values. These features of our analysis call into 
question the very conception of a fair asking price—something acceptable to both sides 
using some single set of criteria.  The final moral of our story is that fair asking prices are 
fragile things—not justifiable on the same basis to both sides, even when they do exist at 
all.  (And the St. Petersburg game in particular enjoys no fair asking price, not even an 
infinite one.)  If one believes that there is a fair asking price for everything, then St. 
Petersburg remains a paradox.  But St. Petersburg challenges this notion.  Instead it 
illuminates the following fact:  that fair asking prices are genuine economic achievements 
in real-life circumstances, not things one can simply take for granted on the basis of a 
single computation.  If you are to be successful as a merchant, you have to provide 
something that multiple customers will be sufficiently capitalized to purchase, at prices 
you yourself can afford to charge.  This is no mean feat.   
 
9. Great expectations 
Our analysis now lends support to the following principles: 
1. Expectations are meaningful only with respect to a population of relevantly 
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each side of the bargain.  On the house side, the population is that of indefinite-
sized and potential infinite ensembles.  On the player side, the population is that 
of finite and definitely smaller ensembles (because on the player side the entrance 
fee is a limiting consideration). 
2. No expectation exists for the St. Petersburg game. But finite ensemble averages 
do exist. Ensemble averages rise with the size of ensemble. 
3. This means that the St. Petersburg is a different game from the standpoint of the 
house than from the standpoint of the player, since there is no meaningful finite 
ensemble for the house.  The figures used by a house to determine its stance on 
the St. Petersburg differ substantially from those used by a player. 
4. The house has to view offering the St. Petersburg as offering an infinite sequence 
of the game. (This proves to be an unattractive proposal since the house is 
exposed to enormous risks that they cannot cover by charging a reasonable fee to 
players.) Whereas the player has to assess the value of playing the game with 
reference to a proposed game-bundle size.  And their cost of play has to be 
construed in terms of the capital they can put to serve the goals of playing the 
number of games in this ensemble, not simply a single one.  (Our simulations 
prove that the sums involved are really substantial, so the St. Petersburg is 
unattractive to the player as well.) 
5. The St. Petersburg bargain has to be analyzed within the framework of a 
bargaining theory, because the statistics affect the parties differentially.  This is 
the normal case in any problem of determining a “fair asking price.”  Hence the 
problem of determining a fair asking price is in general a problem for game-




10. You only go around once 
 
Capitalization is still only a small part of our story here.  We said that, when you find 
yourself ill-capitalized to capitalize on a given bargain (to coin a bad phrase), you start 
looking around for bargains in relation to which you are indeed better capitalized to 
achieve your goals in them.  A critic might insist that this is either an irrational way to 
proceed (because, as they might insist, it gives too little weight to expectations), or 
employs a hidden premise—to the effect that there are other bargains to consider, and 
that’s why you find the gamble unattractive (rather than anything intrinsic to the gamble 
itself).   So more must be said as to why the concept of capitalization is relevant.  It is 
relevant because it answers the question of why we accept gambles in the first place. 
 
The concept of capitalization helps us make sense of the fact that certain bargains are 
categorically (intrinsically, as one might say) unattractive to a given player—for 
example, gambles involving the lives of my children.  This is because I can’t consider 
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and there are no further gambles to take—no way for me to come out ahead in the end.  I 
must consider my gambles with my children’s lives (where I am obliged to take them, as 
many persons in history have been so obliged) as inherently single-trial gambles.  And 
this explains (at least in part) why these sorts of gambles are so unattractive. 
 
This then brings out a fundamental point about gamble assessment—or, in more 
philosophical terms, valuation of prospects.  A gamble, when taken, must be construed as 
a means to an end—a means to an expected payout; in the strictest sense this has to be 
thought of in terms of its utility rather than its absolute or market value.  (It is a rare 
person who takes a gamble for its own sake—and in many such cases we are inclined to 
think the gamble-loving agents are suffering from some form of illness.)   And so a 
gamble taken, to be considered rational, has to be measured by its goodness as a means to 
an end in sight. Above we argued that certain gambles (for instance, short-bundle 
gambles of the game depicted in Figure 8 Left) is a poor means to the end in view of 
doubling your 1000 mu, as compared for instance to its same-expectation cousins 
depicted in Figure 8 Right, or either of those depicted in Figure 7.  Why?  For the same 
reason that a hammer is a poor means to the end of driving a screw, as compared with a 
screwdriver: using the hammer runs a much greater risk of ruining your work, though if 
it’s all you have, and the job has to be done right now, you might use it anyway.  By 
looking at the PDF of a gamble, we can render more nuanced appraisals as to whether the 
gamble in question provides us with good “specs” vis-à-vis the job we’d like to use it for.  
 
Expectations are just the beginning of the story of rational decision making; they’re not 
the end.  And we’ve noted here that an important part of what is being achieved in a 
given gamble involves how many times the gamble is, can or must be undertaken.  This is 
an important consideration that players must attend to in service of their ends. To provide 
genuinely useful assessments of gambles, we must be sensitive to this feature of the 
undertaking.  The one-size-fits-all-approach to which we have become accustomed in 
applications of EU has to give way to more nuances.  And this is no less true vis-à-vis  
the St. Petersburg game. 
 
We have had to take two angles on St. Petersburg to understand its unattractiveness.  And 
we have to take into consideration a wide variety of features of the gamble’s statistics in 
order to determine how well the gamble fits with a player’s goals.  On the buyer’s side 
what explains the bargain’s unattractiveness is not so much that the probability of the big 
payout is so small, but that the buyer might not be capitalized sufficiently for using the 
St. Petersburg game as a means of “scoring.”  And on the merchant side, it’s not so much 
that what’s at stake is so big, as that the merchant can’t restrict her/his exposure to it in a 
way that makes sense for business—which is a volume business, in which extended 
exposure is precisely the point. 
11. Conclusion 
To appraise a bargain, one needs to do more than assess its expectation value: one needs 
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with other instrumentalities for achieving those goals.  This is a fundamental element of 
instrumental reasoning, and must not be lost sight of.  It sheds enormous light on the 
differences in attractiveness between single plays and bundles of plays of the same 
gamble.  And once we appreciate these differences, we will appreciate much more the 
contributions to an appraisal that are made by the statistics of gambles.  And we will wish 
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public class DebtCalculator implements Runnable { 
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 public static Random rng = new Random(); 
 
 int fee; 
 
 public DebtCalculator(int i) { 
  fee = i; 
 } 
 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
  for (int f = 0; f < 30; f++) { 
   new DebtCalculator(f).run(); 
   //new DebtCalculator(f).start(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 public void run() { 
  double avgDebt = 0; 
 
  for (int i = 0; i < nRuns; i++) { 
   long maxDebt = 0; 
   long money = 0; 
   while (money <= 0) { 
    money -= fee; 
    int table = 1; 
    while (rng.nextInt(2) == 0) 
     table *= 2; 
 
    if (money < maxDebt) 
     maxDebt = money; 
 
    money += table; 
   } 
   avgDebt += maxDebt; 
  } 
  avgDebt /= nRuns; 
  System.out.println(fee + "\t" + Math.abs(avgDebt)); 
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